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COURT OF APPEALS, 1959 TERM
to permit harassing and inconsistent actions resulting in unnecessary and pro3
longed litigation and possibly multiple recoveries."'
"IN

EMPLOYMENT" UNDER DIsABmIITy BENEFITS LAW

The New York Disability Benefits Law provides that "employees in employment of a covered employer for four or more consecutive weeks ... shall
be eligible for disability benefits ..... Every such employee shall continue to
be eligible during such employment" (emphasis added). 14 Thus, while the
Workmen's Compensation Law provides benefits for occupationally-incurred
disabilities and the Unemployment Insurance Law for persons, who, though
available for work, are unable to continue at work, this law is aimed at bridging the gap between the first two by providing non-occupational disability
benefits. 15
In Flo v. General Electric Company,16 the claimant, a married woman,
had been an employee of the General Electric Company for six years when
she went on compulsory maternity leave of absence under company rules which
required an eight week interval following the birth of the child before the
employee could return to work. During the eight week period the claimant
was operated upon for causes unrelated to the pregnancy and as a result was
disabled for several months.
Claimant applied to the Workmen's Compensation Board, which awarded
disability benefits on the ground that the compulsory maternity leave of absence
did not constitute a termination of the employment relationship. Upon appeal
the Appellate Division dismissed the claim, l the majority there taking the
view that the employer's liability to pay disability benefits was not dependant
on the existence of the employer-employee relationship but, rather upon the
ground that the claimant was "in active wage-earning employment at the
time."' 8
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that although the woman was
not actually serving her employer during the leave when the disability occurred,
the employment relationship had not been severed thereby, and she was entitled to benefits for a disability which, though unrelated to her pregnancy,
occurred during her maternity leave.
In each case where the Court has previously construed the meaning of
the phrase "in employment" as set forth in Section 203 of the Disability Benefits Law, the interpretation has to a large extent depended on the particular
facts. So in Kriete v. Todd Shipyards,'9 where an employee had been working
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for eleven years under the "shape-up" system and had in the past worked
several times for periods of four or more consecutive weeks as Section 203
requires, the Court held that the employment relationship existed under the
terms of the statute even though the disability occurred less than two weeks
following the employee's return to the job after a leave of absense.
Also relied upon by the Court was Decker v. Dunkler,20 in which the
Court previously denied appeal from a decision of the Workmen's Compensation
Board awarding disability benefits to an employee whose disability occurred
during the period the employee was disabled by reason of an accident covered
by the Workmen's Compensation Law. The Board found that the employment
relationship was not terminated by the period of "on the job" disability. In
relying on this decision the Court here reaffirms the principle laid down in that
case, that "the statute should be applied in light of the existing employeremployee relationship." 21
Viewed in the light of existing cases interpreting the meaning of "in employment" and the employment relationship, it is clear that the Court here
construed the leave to be a continuance of the claimant's employment for the
purpose of disability benefits and that these terms do not have a fixed, literal
meaning for all purposes. Rather, these terms require an interpretation within
the context in which they are used. It would seem that in order to find that
the statute applies, the Court will require but two factors to be present: that
the employee have worked at some time during his employment (by the employer against whom he presently brings his claim) for a period of four or
more consecutive weeks,22 and that the employee be in contemplation of re23
turning to work for his employer.
In construing a statute, a court need not be confined to the literal meaning
of the words and the intention is to be gathered from the purpose and underlying policies of the enactment. 24 Thus, this Court's liberal interpretation of the
Disability Benefits Law seems to be warranted.
REQUIREMENTS FOR SUBROGATION UNDER SECTION

OF

29

THE WORKMMN'S COMPENSATION LAw

The New York Workmen's Compensation Law provides that an employee
who is injured in the course of his employment by the negligence of a third
party is not required to make an election in advance between taking a compensation award or bringing an action against the third party tortfeasor.
However, if he chooses to take a compensation award and later decides to
pursue his common-law action against the wrongdoer, the action must be
commenced not later than six months after the awarding of compensation or,
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